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ABSTRACT
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout suggested a few years after the publication of their 1999 Virginia Law Review article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, that their team production model was poised to
emerge as part of a new corporate law “paradigm.” In so doing, they
specifically invoked Thomas Kuhn’s well-known analysis of scientific
revolutions. This Article revisits Blair and Stout’s team production theory by offering a critique of their claim that their model is destined to become a new corporate law paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. In so doing
the Article draws upon key corporate law theories and trends to offer
insights concerning the team production model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout introduced the team production theory of corporate law in a landmark 1999 article in the Virginia Law Review.1 Their team production model, as is well known, characterized the
board of directors as a mediating hierarchy that balances the interests of a
corporation’s various constituencies and does so in a way that successfully addresses, in the context of the publicly traded corporation, the challenges associated with fostering productive activity requiring combined
investment and coordinated effort.2 According to Blair and Stout, their
team production theory was an analytical step forward compared to the
influential contractarian model of the corporation, which is oriented
around “agency costs” with managers as agents and shareholders as principals.3 Additionally, they said their model explicitly challenged a dominant shareholder primacy “norm.”4 Blair and Stout subsequently suggest*

S.J. Berwin Professor of Corporate Law, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge.
1. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247 (1999).
2. Id. at 253, 271–72, 275–86, 298–305; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 419–22 (2001).
3. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 248–50, 254–55.
4. Id. at 249, 253.
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ed in a 2006 article that the team production model not only could explain a wide range of important phenomena in the business world but
potentially provided the basis for a new corporate law paradigm, a claim
Stout reiterated in her 2012 book The Shareholder Value Myth.5
Blair and Stout’s team production model has attracted widespread
interest—as of 2012, no other legal article published in 1999 had been
cited more often6—and clearly is an appropriate departure point for a
conference such as the Sixth Annual Berle Symposium.7 Nevertheless,
while Blair and Stout’s work on team production constitutes a logical
and admirable choice as the topic for the Sixth Berle Symposium, their
invocation of “paradigm” rhetoric to characterize the team production
model’s place in the corporate law theory firmament is problematic.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a paradigm can be defined as “a generally accepted world view.”8 Blair and Stout have not
employed “paradigm” in this generic sense when seeking to situate the
team production model. Instead, they have specifically referenced Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.9 In this widely cited
book, Kuhn deployed the term “paradigm” in order to characterize scientific endeavor in a manner different from the orthodox view that
knowledge accumulates by reliance on “scientific method.”10
Blair and Stout’s 2006 invocation of Kuhn’s analytical framework
was not entirely a novel one. Instead, other corporate law scholars, including myself, had previously drawn upon Kuhn to describe trends in
corporate law theory.11 I argued, when I discussed Kuhn in a 2004 publi5. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 58, 85 (2012); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 723, 733–
37 (2006). See further infra notes 20–22 and related discussion.
6. Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1495 (2012). The search methodology extended beyond law reviews to encompass other academic journals. Id. at 1486–87.
7. Moreover, Justice John Paul Stevens cited Blair and Stout’s 1999 article in his widely read
dissenting opinion in Citizens United. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 U.S. 876,
978 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Research by Margaret Blair Cited in Citizens United Dissent,
VANDERBILT LAW SCH. (Feb. 18, 2010), http://law.vanderbilt.edu/news/research-by-margaret-blaircited-in-citizens-united-dissent/.
8. Paradigm, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014), available at http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/137329?redirectedFrom=paradigm#eid.
9. Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of
Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1181 n.65 (2013) (discussing THOMAS
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996)); Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at
721–22; STOUT, supra note 5, at 58.
10. See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE TRAJECTORY OF (CORPORATE LAW) SCHOLARSHIP: AN
INAUGURAL LECTURE GIVEN IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE OCTOBER 2003, at 12–13 (2004).
11. Id. at 51–53, 62–66; Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A
Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1633 (2002).
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cation, that it was unclear whether his characterization of scientific endeavor could be used appropriately to analyze corporate law theory
trends.12 I will make that point briefly again here. For present purposes,
however, it will generally be assumed that Kuhn’s work on scientific
endeavor can be drawn upon to characterize the development of corporate law theory. From this departure point, this article analyzes Blair and
Stout’s team production theory by reference to the Kuhnian framework
they have invoked, and in so doing, argues that characterizing the team
production model as part of a new corporate law paradigm is problematic
in two basic respects.
First, it is doubtful whether the team production model constitutes a
sufficiently radical departure from other theories to qualify as a new paradigm. In Kuhnian terms, a new paradigm emerges after an intellectual
crisis sets the stage for a “paradigm shift.”13 It follows that the team production model, as the core element of a new paradigm, should have constituted a fundamental departure from received wisdom. It is far from
clear that the theory qualifies. The idea that boards of publicly traded
companies constitute mediating hierarchs harkens back to a
“managerialist” conception of the corporation that was, during the mid20th century, associated with a highly influential separation of ownership
and control theory of publicly traded companies. Moreover, Blair and
Stout did not reject outright in their 1999 article what was, at the time,
the dominant intellectual construct in corporate law: the “nexus of contracts” model of the corporation. Instead, Blair and Stout said their intention was to use contractarian analysis as an intellectual departure point to
develop a more fully rounded conception of corporate law.14
Second, even if the team production model can be distinguished
sufficiently from prior corporate law theories to qualify as a new paradigm, it is by no means assured that it will prevail in the battle of ideas in
the manner required. Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman made this
point in a 2006 article that appeared in the same symposium issue as the
article in which Blair and Stout invoked Kuhn to situate the team production model.15 Gilson and Kraakman, in addition to suggesting that it
should fall to observers other than those who have developed a theoretical model to assess the model’s significance, indicated that Blair and
Stout’s claim that the team production model amounted to a new para-

12. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 65–66.
13. Id. at 14–15.
14. See infra notes 79, 82–83 and related discussion; CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 50–53.
15. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise on Corporate Law: Filling
Manning’s Empty Towers, 31 J. CORP. L. 597 (2006).
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digm in corporate law scholarship was premature.16 This point is as salient now as when Gilson and Kraakman first made it, if not more so.
The most robust challenge Blair and Stout made to conventional
wisdom in their 1999 article concerned shareholder primacy. According
to team production theory, directors should not privilege shareholders in
the manner the shareholder primacy norm implies, but instead should be
disinterested trustees who faithfully represent the interests of all team
members.17 Given that shareholder primacy is antithetical to the idea that
boards of public companies should conduct themselves as mediating hierarchs balancing the interests of corporate constituencies, it appears that
the team production model can only move to the forefront if shareholder
primacy is being eclipsed. This does not appear to be happening. Instead,
over the past few years there has been a surge in shareholder influence in
publicly traded corporations, prompted primarily by activism campaigns
hedge funds have launched.
The Financial Times suggested in 2013 that “Corporate America
and activist investors have had a war; the activists have won.”18 It logically follows, as a Wall Street Journal columnist observed in 2014, that
activist investor priorities have “hardened into the default boardroom
agenda.”19 Directors thinking in this way are ill suited to function as mediating hierarchs arbitrating in an unbiased way between key corporate
constituencies. Correspondingly, the “inconvenient truth” of hedge fund
activism refutes, at least for the time being, Blair and Stout’s prediction
of the team production model’s emergence as a corporate law theory paradigm, or least sub-paradigm.
II. IDENTIFYING CORPORATE LAW PARADIGMS
Blair and Stout, citing the work of Kuhn, suggested in a 2006 Journal of Corporation Law article that their team production model was part
of “a new paradigm . . . appearing in corporate law scholarship.”20 Stout,
again citing Kuhn, made a similar claim in her 2012 book, The Shareholder Value Myth.21 According to Stout, team production theory showed
that businesses could not thrive if they were run according to shareholder
primacy ideology, a “‘dominant paradigm of corporate purpose’” apt to
be replaced by a new, alternative theory due to the prevalence of sup16. Id. at 603 n.19.
17. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 286.
18. Carl Icahn, Web Mogul, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 26, 2013, at 24.
19. Denis K. Berman, For Activists There are No More Worlds to Conquer, WALL ST. J., Apr.
23, 2014, at B1.
20. Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 723, 733–37.
21. See STOUT, supra note 5.
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posed anomalies inconsistent with shareholder primacy’s essential precepts.22
A. The Kuhnian Framework
In order to assess whether team production theory is a candidate for
paradigmatic status in the sense Kuhn intended, the essential elements of
the Kuhnian framework require explication and predecessor corporate
law paradigms need to be identified. In an inaugural lecture published in
the form of a 2004 monograph, I analyzed various potential trajectories
for the evolution of knowledge in intellectual disciplines and used corporate law scholarship as a case study.23 Kuhn’s characterization of the development of scientific endeavor was one of the trajectories that I took
into account of and, applying his intellectual framework to corporate law
theory, identified potential corporate law paradigms.24 I draw liberally
here on what I said then in order to summarize Kuhn’s thinking and identify the corporate law theory paradigms relevant to team production theory.
According to Kuhn, research proceeds beyond an “immature” or
“pre-paradigm” phase once enough sufficiently convincing work is carried out in a given field for agreement to be generated concerning key
theoretical precepts.25 With a tight research consensus in place, those
working in the field are then spared the distracting reexamination of first
principles and instead use the dominant “paradigm” as the departure
point to solve “puzzles” posed, thereby yielding incremental improvements in analysis. Kuhn, focused as he was on the development of scientific endeavor, referred to such research as “normal science” constituting
“mop up” work within a “mature” field.
Kuhn noted that those working in accordance with the precepts of
normal science can encounter periodically inexplicable anomalies. These
anomalies often prompt small adjustments within normal science as confirmation or disconfirmation of various theories falling within the governing paradigm proceeds.26 Another possibility, however, is that unexplained anomalies will accumulate sufficiently to destabilize the existing
22. Id. at 58, 85.
23. See CHEFFINS, supra note 10. A slightly modified version was published in the Cambridge
Law Journal. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63
CAMBRIDGE
L.J.
456
(2004).
A
working
paper
version
is
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=429624.
24. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 13–14, 62–65.
25. Kuhn’s seminal work on point is KUHN, supra note 9. The summary of his thinking provided here is drawn from CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 13–15.
26. Robert Cooter, Maturing into Normal Science: The Effect of Empirical Legal Studies on
Law and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1475, 1476 (2011).
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consensus. A “scientific revolution” will then occur that can yield a new
paradigm oriented around an entirely new theoretical framework. After
this sort of “paradigm shift,” normal science recommences and the stage
is set for the cycle to repeat itself.
B. The Separation of Ownership and Control/Managerial Capitalism
“Paradigm”
Assuming for the sake of argument that Kuhn’s paradigm terminology can be applied to corporate law theory, a separation of ownership
and control thesis qualifies as the initial paradigm, at least with respect to
U.S. public companies.27 An inconclusive debate during the opening
decades of the twentieth century on the nature of corporate personality
can be categorized as corporate law theory’s “immature” phase. Matters
changed with the 1932 publication of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s
The Modern Corporation and Private Property,28 which is widely credited with showing that a separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (top management) was prevalent in large public companies.29 A consensus subsequently emerged among corporate law academics—at least
in the United States—that for publicly traded companies, Berle and
Means’s separation of ownership and control thesis was the appropriate
intellectual departure point for analyzing corporate law.
In the classic “Berle–Means corporation,”30 widely dispersed shareholders lacking sufficient financial incentives to intervene would remain
passive while professionally trained executives managed the firm. A corporation of this sort could benefit from high-quality management because executives could be hired purely on the basis of their managerial
capabilities.31 There was a danger, however, that due to insufficient accountability to shareholders or others, those running large corporations
would become “irresponsible oligarchs.”32 For decades following the
1932 publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property this
possibility provided the departure point for the bulk of theoreticallyoriented corporate law scholarship in the United States. As Roberta Ro27. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 38–40, 62–63.
28. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
29. Though Berle and Means were hailed for making the separation of ownership and control
point empirically, the evidence they offered in fact was equivocal. See Brian Cheffins & Steven
Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 443, 443, 453–54 (2009).
30. The term was coined by Mark Roe. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 11 (1991).
31. THE HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE i, xi (Brian R. Cheffins ed.,
2011).
32. Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AMER. ECON. REV.
311, 316 (1957).

2015]

Team Production Model as a Paradigm

403

mano observed in a 1984 article on corporate law theory and law reform,
Berle and Means’s separation of ownership and control thesis became
“the master problem for research.”33 To the extent that the thesis constituted the initial corporate law theory paradigm, the scholarship that addressed the legal and policy implications can be thought of as normal
science.34
Berle and Means’s separation of ownership and control thesis came
to prominence in tandem with a philosophy of “managerialism” that was
a core feature of an era of “managerial capitalism.”35 During the late
nineteenth century and the opening decades of the twentieth century, the
United States experienced what distinguished business historian Alfred
Chandler would characterize as a “managerial revolution” where a growing division between ownership and control was accompanied by increasingly sophisticated managerial hierarchies and the development of
an increasingly professional ethos among corporate executives.36 According to Chandler, who identified Berle and Means as the first to point
out the separation of ownership and control,37 by the 1950s and 1960s
“managerial capitalism had triumphed” with the managerial enterprise
being dominant in pivotal sectors of the U.S. economy.38
While a separation of ownership and control creates risks of managerial abuse of power, in the decades immediately following World War
II only rarely did executives fail to fulfill the responsibilities associated
with the stewardship of corporate assets.39 This can plausibly be attributed—as indeed Stout has done—to the mind-set of executives during the
managerial capitalism era. She has suggested directors and executives of
33. Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923
(1984).
34. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 63.
35. For a succinct overview of the chronology and terminology, see GERALD F. DAVIS,
MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RE-SHAPED AMERICA 32–33, 62–63 (2009).
36. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 9, 484 (1977).
37. Alfred D. Chandler, The Competitive Performance of U.S. Industrial Enterprises Since the
Second World War, 68 BUS. HIST. REV. 1, 14 (1994). In fact, others had remarked upon the phenomenon previously but did not offer the extensive documentation Berle and Means provided. See
Cheffins & Bank, supra note 29, at 452–53.
38. Alfred D. Chandler, The United States: Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism, in
MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF THE MODERN
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 35 (Alfred D. Chandler & Herman Daems eds., 1980).
39. See DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM 106 (2005) (saying that while U.S. business culture was susceptible to counterproductively risky “Icaran” tendencies during the decades
following the Great Depression “[i]t became much harder for an Icaran entrepreneur to disguise what
he was doing. For a time, at least, Icarus had been tamed.”); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond
Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 117, 123 (1988) (“During the first
half of the twentieth century, the self-serving antics of managers seemed relatively innocuous.”);
THE HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 31, at xi–xii.
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managerialist public companies were faithful corporate servants because
they “viewed themselves as stewards or trustees charged with guiding a
vital social and economic institution . . . .”40
According to Stout, a beneficial by-product of post-World War II
managerial attitudes was that “managerial capitalism worked surprisingly
well for dispersed and powerless shareholders.”41 Management, however,
did not focus myopically on stockholders. According to Stout, boards
and executives who embraced the managerialist philosophy did not see
themselves “as mere agents of shareholders . . . .”42 Instead, they viewed
themselves as stewards running their companies “in the interests of a
wide range of beneficiaries. Certainly they looked out for investors’ interests, but they looked out for the interests of employees, customers, and
the nation as well.”43
Stout, in offering her favorable verdict on managerial capitalism,
concurred in large measure with Berle. While Berle and Means’s separation of ownership and control thesis implied a potentially detrimental
lack of managerial accountability, in the foreword to a 1959 book, The
Corporation in Modern Society, Berle said, “The principles and practice
of big business in 1959 seem to be considerably more responsible, more
perceptive and (in plain English) more honest than they were in 1929.”44
In a 1962 law review article, he similarly noted that serious corporate
scandals were “happily, rare” and acknowledged that conflicts of interest
between managers and shareholders had not become more pronounced
despite an acceleration of the separation of ownership and control in the
three decades following the publication of The Modern Corporation and
Private Property.45
There was, in addition, agreement between Berle and Stout on the
goals and aspirations of executives during the era of managerial capitalism. Coincident with the publication of The Modern Corporation and
Private Property, Berle engaged in a well-known debate with E. Merrick
Dodd with, in Berle’s words, “the writer holding that corporate powers
were held in trust for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued that the-

40. Stout, supra note 9, at 1171.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (footnote omitted).
44. Adolf A. Berle, Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY ix, xiii (Edward S.
Mason ed., 1959).
45. Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437–
38 n.9 (1962). One should not assume, however, that unsavory behavior was entirely absent in U.S.
public corporations in the mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., Donald C. Hambrick, Just How Bad Are
Our Theories? A Response to Ghoshal, 4 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 104, 106 (2005).
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se powers were held in trust for the entire community.”46 Berle conceded
in 1954 that “[t]he argument ha[d] been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.”47 Berle elaborated, saying that corporations, as “trustees for the community,” must “provide a given set of goods and services for the community and in so doing
so must provide employment for a great number of people” and should
“assure the continued stability, health, and serviceability of their industries.”48 He added in his foreword to The Corporation in Modern Society
that “modern directors are not limited to running business enterprise for
maximum profit, but are in fact and recognized in law as administrators
of a community system.”49 How did shareholders fare under this system?
Berle said, consistent with Stout’s verdict on managerial capitalism, that
shareholders usually did “well, even though stockholders do not hold the
center of the corporate stage . . . .”50
Berle’s managerialist views were mainstream for the time. A 1961
Harvard Business Review survey of 1,700 senior managers found that
83% agreed it was unethical for “executives to act in the interests of
shareholders alone, and not also in the interests of employees and consumers . . . .”51 More generally, according to Harwell Wells, during the
1950s and 1960s the idea that executives “were responsible no longer for
shareholders alone, but for other constituencies and, indeed, society at
large” was accepted by a “wide swathe of individuals, from leftist social
critics, to moderate theorists of the corporation, to senior executives
themselves . . . .”52

46. ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954). On the 1930s
debate between Berle and Dodd, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 122–35
(2008); Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American
Legal Thought, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 205–09 (2005); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN.
L. REV. 77, 87–99, 101–04 (2002).
47. BERLE, supra note 46, at 169.
48. Id. at 170.
49. Berle, supra note 44, at xii.
50. BERLE, supra note 46, at 170.
51. Raymond C. Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, 39 HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug.
1961, at 6, 10 (1961), quoted in Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1512
(2007).
52. Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, and
the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 326,
331 (2013).
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C. “Paradigm Shift”: The Nexus of Contracts Model of the Corporation
Again, according to Kuhn’s scientific methodology typology, “paradigm shifts” are preceded by the emergence of doubts concerning the
existing paradigm followed by a “scientific revolution” yielding a new
paradigm.53 With respect to corporate law theory, robust questioning of
the separation of the ownership and control paradigm was evident by the
early 1970s. As Henry Manne said in 1973:
We have begun to note a whole series of questions related to the nature of the firm, particularly large, publicly-held corporations. Here
the issue of discontinuities in the interests of shareholders and managers, popularly raised by Berle and Means in 1933, shows more vitality than seemed likely only a few years ago.54

Continuing with the Kuhnian analogy, the accumulation of anomalies was followed during the late 1970s and the 1980s with a scientific
revolution in the area of corporate law theory, which culminated with a
paradigm shift in favor of the nexus of contracts model of the corporation.55 Strongly influenced by economists who departed from economic
orthodoxy and treated the firm as a nexus of contracting relationships,
rather than a “black box,” “contractarian”56 corporate law, academics
prompted “a revolution in corporate law scholarship.”57 The revolution,
according to a 2013 book on corporate law theory by Marc Moore, resulted in an “objectively indisputable fact: that the contractarian paradigm is unquestionably the dominant ideological reference point with the
field of Anglo-American corporate law and governance today.”58
To the extent that the nexus of contracts model was a new paradigm, the paradigm shift was complete by the early 1990s.59 As William
Bratton said in 1992 of contractarian scholars exemplified by Frank
53. See supra note 25 and related discussion.
54. Henry G. Manne, The Limits and Rationale of Corporate Altruism: An Individualistic
Model, 59 VA. L. REV. 708, 708–09 (1973).
55. MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE 62, 67 (2013).
56. Jack Coffee has been credited for first using the term “contractarian” to describe those
engaging in nexus of contracts analysis. See Brian Dean Abramson, Why the Limited Liability Company Should Sound the Death Knell of the Application of the “Nexus of Contracts” Theory to Corporations, 1 FIU L. REV. 185, 187 n.8 (2006) (citing John C. Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989)).
57. Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of the Nature of the Firm on the Theory of Corporate
Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 231 (1993); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449
(1989) (“Critics and advocates agree that a revolution, under the banner ‘nexus of contracts,’ has in
the last decade swept through the legal theory of the corporation.”). For additional background, see
CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 44–47.
58. MOORE, supra note 55, at 71–72.
59. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 49.
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Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, “the campaign has ended with victory
achieved.”60 Blair and Stout acknowledged the prevalence of
contractarian thinking in their 1999 team production article, saying it had
“become common for both economic and legal theorists to view a corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts’ . . . .”61 Similarly, they observed in a 2001
article that “[c]ontractarian thinking . . . preoccupies modern corporate
law scholarship.”62
Agency cost, or principal–agent theory, was a pivotal feature of the
newly dominant contractarian analysis.63 The theory presupposes that, in
economic terms, an agency relationship arises when one person (the
agent) has been engaged by another (the principal) to perform a service
with some decisionmaking authority being delegated to the agent.64 Blair
and Stout argued in their 1999 article that the growing prominence of
agency cost theory had a significant knock-on effect, namely helping to
foster the dominance of a “shareholder primacy norm.”65 They said the
principal–agent model
has given rise to two recurring themes in the literature: First, the
central economic problem addressed by corporation law is reducing
“agency costs” by keeping directors and managers faithful to shareholders’ interests; and second, that the primary goal of the public
corporation is—or ought to be—maximizing shareholders’ wealth.66

In the corporate law realm, academics did deploy agency cost theory primarily to examine the relationship between shareholders of publicly
traded corporations on one hand and senior management on the other.67
Nevertheless, neither agency cost theory nor contractarian analysis was
60. William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 NW.
U. L. REV. 180, 190 (1992).
61. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 319.
62. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737 n.2 (2001). David Millon, in an article critiquing team production theory, offered a similar verdict on this point, noting that with respect to
corporate law scholarship “a law-and-economics approach predominates.” David Millon, New Game
Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1001, 1009 (2000).
63. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 45.
64. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
65. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 253. They were not the first academics to use this term. On
various predecessors, see D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,
278 n.1 (1998).
66. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 248–49. Other academics have similarly suggested the principal–agent model implies shareholder primacy. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 11, at 1631, 1639.
67. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 62, at 1001 (“[T]he currently dominant analytical approach to
corporate law . . . is the principal–agent model of the relationship between the corporation’s shareholders and its management.”).
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inextricably linked to shareholder primacy. For instance, agency cost
theory is potentially applicable to a wide range of economic contexts, not
just manager–shareholder interaction in public companies.68 As Blair and
Stout pointed out themselves in their 1999 article, “the public corporation is hardly unique in its use of agents.”69
With respect to contractarian analysis and the shareholder primacy
norm, as noted corporate law academic Melvin Eisenberg has said, “It is
commonly thought that the nexus-of-contracts conception is connected in
some fundamental way to the concept of shareholder primacy. It isn’t.”70
Instead, with shareholders being merely one constituency that is part of
the nexus of contracts, it is not obvious a priori why managers should
assign shareholders special priority.71 Indeed, Jonathan Macey, another
distinguished corporate law academic, has said “[t]he nexus-of-contracts
approach to the corporation appears to be strongly at odds” with the
proposition that corporations and directors should maximize value for
shareholders, and shareholders alone.72
While neither agency theory nor the nexus of contracts model necessarily compel the invocation of shareholder primacy, contractarian
scholars did, as a practical matter, tend to ascribe preeminence to shareholders in the manner shareholder primacy implies. Advocates of the
nexus of contracts model would, for instance, draw attention to shareholders’ status as “residual claimants”73 in the sense that the return that
shares deliver is based on what is left over after satisfaction of claims by
employees, creditors, and others entitled to “fixed” returns.74 Under such
circumstances, the argument went, shareholder value will tend to coincide with corporate success because every step a corporation takes can
affect shareholder wealth, whereas fixed claimants will be indifferent to
68. For instance, Easterbrook and Fischel, the prominent contractarian corporate law scholars,
used the example of employees generally rather than corporate executives specifically to introduce
the concept of agency costs in their widely cited 1991 book: FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 10 (1991).
69. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 249.
70. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 833 (1999).
71. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 47–48.
72. Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder
Constituencies From a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1267 (1999). See
also Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 445
(2006) (contractarian theory “would seem to open the door quite widely to the consideration of the
interests of other constituencies”).
73. On contractarians making this move, see CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 47–48; Macey, supra
note 72, at 1273.
74. On why shareholders can be thought to constitute residual claimants and other corporate
constituencies constitute fixed claimants, see BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY,
STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 42, 54, 71, 87 (1997).
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corporate policymaking unless the likelihood of default or termination of
contractual relations increases materially.75 Contractarians also cited contracting costs to justify shareholder primacy.76 They suggested that the
preeminent position of shareholders in the corporate nexus of contracts
reflected the fact that creditors, employees, and customers, due to the
fixed nature of their claims, could bargain more readily for suitable protection than shareholders making the open-ended investment associated
with corporate equity.77
III. SITUATING THE TEAM PRODUCTION MODEL
Assuming that developments in corporate law theory can be described by reference to Kuhn’s typology of scientific endeavor, in order
for the team production model to constitute the core element of a new
corporate law paradigm, the theory should constitute a marked intellectual departure from the past. Otherwise, the model would likely amount
merely to mop up work or normal science within the confines of the existing paradigm. Moreover, it will be problematic if team production theory harkens back to a dominant mode of analysis preceding the paradigm
it ostensibly is replacing, as this would imply that the trajectory of corporate law scholarship is not a Kuhnian journey, but instead is primarily
cyclical.
On both counts, the team production model’s status as a new corporate law paradigm is problematic. When one refers back to Blair and
Stout’s 1999 article, their characterization of team production theory is
more closely akin to contractarian normal science than it is to a new paradigm. Moreover, to the extent that the team production model can be
distinguished from the nexus of contracts “paradigm” or its principal–
agent and shareholder primacy “sub-paradigms,”78 the theory arguably
harkens back to what can be thought of as an earlier (sub-)paradigm—
managerialism—as much as it provides the platform for fresh thinking.

75. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 38, 68. For an overview of the logic
involved, see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 46–48 (2004).
76. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 48; MOORE, supra note 55, at 76–77.
77. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual
Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 416–19 (1993). For additional background on this line of
reasoning, see Chen & Hanson, supra note 75, at 52–57.
78. Kuhn never referred to a “sub-paradigm” but others relying on Kuhn’s analytical framework have done so. See, e.g., Tom Mouck, The “Revolution” in Financial Reporting Theory: A
Kuhnian Interpretation, 20 ACCT. HIST. J. 33, 38, 41 (1993); Neil Warren, Is a Scientific Revolution
Taking Place in Psychology: Doubts and Reservations, 1 SCI. STUD. 407, 409 (1971).
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A. “Normal Science”
In Kuhnian terms, academic endeavor that constitutes mop up work
within a “mature” field will not constitute a new paradigm because this
sort of normal science occurs within the intellectual confines of the existing paradigm. Only when the prevailing consensus has been disrupted by
an accumulation of anomalies can a paradigm shift occur. Hence, the
emergence of team production theory as a new paradigm presupposes the
discrediting of prior dominant models. Blair and Stout, in their 1999 article on the team production model, did not characterize the relevant literature in this way. Instead, they emphasized continuity with contractarian
analysis and treated the nexus of contracts model as a key departure point
rather than as an outdated and discredited intellectual construct.79 In
Kuhnian terms, it seems Blair and Stout were engaging in normal science
with the nexus of contracts approach as the dominant paradigm.
Blair and Stout, however, did not adopt the nexus of contracts model wholesale in their 1999 article. They argued that the public corporation
was “not so much a ‘nexus of contracts’ (explicit or implicit) as a ‘nexus
of firm-specific investments’ in which several different groups . . . find it
difficult to protect their contribution through explicit contracts.”80 Additionally, in a 1999 response to an article commenting on team production
theory, Blair and Stout pointed out that “the team production approach
highlights the necessity of finding non-contractual means of inducing
corporate stakeholders, including shareholders, to trust each other
enough to invest in team production.”81 Nevertheless, they said in their
original 1999 article that their approach to public corporations “does not
reject . . . contractarian thinking, but builds upon it by acknowledging the
limits of what can be achieved by explicit contracting.”82 Moreover,
Blair and Stout indicated team production theory was “consistent with
the ‘nexus of contracts’ approach to understanding corporate law” and
explicitly “locate[d] the mediating hierarchy model of the public corporation within the nexus of contracts tradition.”83 In Kuhnian terms, therefore, Blair and Stout were seeking primarily to execute an adjustment in

79. Others have noted previously the continuity between the nexus of contracts model and team
production theory. See, e.g., René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Absolute
Director Primacy, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 387–88 (2011); Meese, supra note 11, at
1644–45.
80. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 275.
81. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Response to Peter C. Kostant’s “Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Course of Corporate Governance and Counsel’s Changing Role”, 28 J. SOCIOECONOMICS 251, 252 (1999) (emphasis added).
82. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 320.
83. Id. at 254 n.17.
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relation to the dominant contractarian paradigm rather than identify
anomalies that would call the paradigm into question.
While Blair and Stout emphasized in their 1999 article continuity
between team production theory and nexus of contracts thinking, they
were less congenial to the principal–agent model and the shareholder
value norm often associated with contractarian analysis. As they said,
“we take issue with both.”84 With agency cost theory, however, Blair and
Stout did not seek to turn the received wisdom entirely on its head. Instead, they acknowledged that “principal–agent analysis has been very
useful in analyzing certain kinds of contractual relationships.”85 What
they sought to question was what they referred to as the “grand-design
principal–agent model,” which assumed that there was a principal in every firm—the shareholders in the case of a corporation—who was understood to be the owner as well as the residual claimant.86 Blair and Stout
said that, because “a public corporation is a team of people who enter
into a complex agreement to work together for their mutual gain,” what
they referred to as “the peak of the pyramid” should be “occupied not by
some owner/principal, but [the] board of directors.”87 Blair and Stout did
not, therefore, reject principal–agent analysis outright in the manner one
would expect with a paradigm shift, but rather sought to recast it in the
context of the public corporation. Arguably, this was more normal science.
Shareholder primacy was a different story. There would be no mop
up work in relation to this (sub-)paradigm. Having identified the board of
the public corporation as the “peak of the pyramid,” Blair and Stout said,
[T]he primary job of the board of directors is not to act as agents
who ruthlessly pursue shareholders’ interests at the expense of employees, creditors, or other team members. Rather, the directors are
trustees for the corporation itself—mediating hierarchs whose job is
to balance members’ competing interests in a fashion that keeps
everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays together.88

Unlike with the nexus of contracts model and principal–agent theory,
Blair and Stout made no effort in their 1999 article to reconcile the team
84. Id. at 249. See also Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Law and the Team Production Problem,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 33, 34 (Claire A. Hill & Brett
H. McDonnell eds., 2012) (“The team production framework challenged the ‘principal–agent’
framework . . . .”).
85. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 259.
86. Id. at 262–63.
87. Id. at 278–79. Blair and Stout explicitly conceded that their “model applie[d] primarily to
public—not private—corporations.” Id. at 281.
88. Id. at 280–81 (emphasis in original).
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production model with shareholder primacy. Instead, their “claim [was]
that directors should be viewed as disinterested trustees charged with
faithfully representing the interests not just of shareholders, but of all
team members.”89 As they said, their “view challenge[d] the shareholder
primacy norm that has come to dominate the theoretical literature.”90
Even if Blair and Stout’s 1999 article challenged the shareholder
primacy norm directly in a way that did not occur with the nexus of contracts model or principal–agent theory, applying the Kuhnian analogy
again, Blair and Stout’s initial presentation of the team production model
could not, at that point in time, constitute a new paradigm. Kuhn’s scientific revolutions presuppose the identification of anomalies and intellectual ferment as a precursor to a paradigm shift.91 With respect to corporate law theory, shareholder primacy was not facing that sort of challenge
at the time Blair and Stout presented their team production model. They
acknowledged in their 1999 article that “most contemporary corporate
scholars tend to assume that directors’ proper role is to maximize the
economic interests of the corporation’s shareholders.”92 Or as Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman said in their 2001 article The End of
History of Corporate Law, “[T]here is today a broad normative consensus that shareholders alone are the parties to whom corporate managers
should be accountable . . . .”93
In the intellectual milieu prevailing at the time Blair and Stout published their 1999 article, in Kuhnian terms the most the article could realistically achieve was to draw attention to anomalies that would help to
foster the debate that could ultimately result in a consensus around a new
paradigm. The manner in which they concluded the article illustrates the
point. Having said “excessive and misleading” emphasis had been
“placed on principal–agent problems in the corporate literature” they indicated “future debates about corporate governance will be more fruitful
if they start from a better model” and they characterized the mediating

89. Id. at 286.
90. Id. at 253.
91. See supra note 26, and related discussion.
92. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 287. Other commentators concurred. See, e.g., Eisenberg,
supra note 70, at 832 (“Most (although by no means all) corporate scholars subscribe to the norm of
shareholder primacy . . . .”); Millon, supra note 62, at 1010 (“It is common coin among commentators to speak of corporate law and fiduciary doctrines as mandating management regard for shareholder interests over those of other corporate constituencies.”); Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the
Berle–Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1129 (2011) (“By the late 1990s, there was
wide agreement among corporate managers, directors, shareholders, and many scholars that the
corporation existed to create shareholder value.”).
93. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History of Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 441 (2001).
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hierarchy model as “a first step toward that better view.”94 In Kuhnian
terms, Blair and Stout were implicitly conceding that, while presentation
of the team production model might help to launch the intellectual journey that would yield a new paradigm, their model was not the new paradigm.
The fact that, in chronological terms, Blair and Stout’s 1999 article
alone would not have heralded the launch of a new corporate law paradigm does not preclude team production theory from subsequently being
a foundational element of such a (sub-)paradigm. As we will see in Part
IV.A, shareholder primacy has faced a strong intellectual challenge since
Hansmann and Kraakman proclaimed in 2001 “[t]he triumph of the
shareholder-oriented model of the corporation.”95 This intellectual ferment theoretically could have opened the way for a new paradigm oriented around the team production model. Before we canvass that possibility, we will consider whether, whatever the current status of shareholder primacy, the team production model is more of an intellectual
throwback rather than a forerunner.
B. Managerialism Redux?
It has been assumed up to this point, consistent with Blair and
Stout’s invocation of Kuhn and his paradigm terminology, that Kuhn’s
work is relevant to corporate law scholarship. The appropriateness of this
move cannot be taken for granted even though legal scholars have frequently borrowed from Kuhn to describe trends in the academic literature.96 The fact Kuhn was focusing on the development of scientific
thought rather than intellectual endeavor generally is an obvious source
of concern on this front.
Scientific inquiry involves explicit theory building, data collection,
hypothesis testing, replication, and corroboration.97 Robert Cooter has
argued that the recent flourishing of empirical legal scholarship has
meant that the law and economics movement that began to transform
academic writing about law in the 1970s and 1980s has matured into
Kuhn’s normal science.98 Empirical research and economic analysis

94. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 328.
95. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 93, at 468.
96. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 13.
97. Id. at 6; Nancy Cook, Law as Science: Revisiting Langdell’s Paradigm in the 21st Century,
88 N.D. L. REV. 21, 28 (2012).
98. Cooter, supra note 26, at 1479. See also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 901, 904 (2011) (referring to the “exponential growth” in empirical legal scholarship “in the past few years”); Thomas Ulen, The Unexpected Guest: Law and Economics, Law and
Other Cognate Disciplines, and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 414–
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more generally may have added a fresh “scientific” dimension to corporate law research.99 Still, explicit deployment of scientific methodology
remains the exception to the rule in corporate law scholarship, which
continues to be primarily oriented around doctrinal and policy-related
research.100 Many legal academics even doubt whether deployment of
scientific method is appropriate for the study of law.101 Correspondingly,
drawing upon an analytical framework designed to account for the development of science to characterize corporate law scholarship trends is a
problematic move.102
Even if parallels between scientific endeavor and corporate law
scholarship are sufficient to mean that Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions is potentially salient, it remains open to question whether changing
trends in corporate law theory can be characterized as paradigm shifts.
Kuhn’s paradigm shifts cannot occur without a paradigm, which, according to Kuhn, requires a tight research consensus that provides the platform for the mop up work associated with normal science.103 It is open to
debate whether a paradigm of this sort has ever existed with corporate
law theory. For instance, Berle and Means’s separation of ownership and
control analysis and the nexus of contracts model were much more influential and widely accepted in the United States than elsewhere in the
world.104 Hence, with corporate law scholarship it is only possible to
speak of paradigms if the United States can be treated in isolation as the
appropriate reference point.
Even setting the foreign angle to one side, it is unclear whether the
research consensus required for there to be a paradigm in the Kuhnian
sense has ever been present in the corporate law area. For instance, despite Moore’s 2013 declaration of a corporate law “contractarian paradigm” and a 2001 acknowledgment by Blair and Stout that the nexus of
contacts model “preoccupie[d] modern corporate law scholarship,”105 a
substantial number of American corporate law academics were never
converted.106 The situation has been similar with the shareholder primacy
(sub-)paradigm. While Hansmann and Kraakman indicated that there
was a “broad normative consensus” concerning the preeminence of
18, 426–27 (2004) (indicating that law and economics had made legal scholarship more scientific
but bemoaning the paucity of empirical research).
99. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 60–61.
100. Id. at 61–62.
101. Ulen, supra note 98, at 413.
102. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 65.
103. See supra note 25 and related discussion.
104. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 66.
105. See supra notes 55, 62 and related discussion.
106. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 49, 66.
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shareholders,107 even when they made this claim, adherence to shareholder primacy was not uniform among corporate law scholars. Robert
Clark observed, for instance, in a response to papers published in a symposium marking the twentieth anniversary of his 1986 treatise on corporate law,108 “A major trend in legal scholarship since the publication of
my treatise has been the elaboration and defense of differing viewpoints
about the purposes of corporations and the proper allocation of powers
and duties among their constituents.”109
If, with respect to corporate law, there have not been Kuhnian paradigms—thus precluding possible paradigm shifts to the team production
theory—how might the model’s intellectual contribution be characterized? Paradigm shifts constitute only one of a series of potential trajectories for corporate law scholarship. One alternative possibility which is
salient in this particular context is a cyclical dimension, in the sense that
academic endeavor constitutes, at least to some degree, a continuing
conversation about core questions.110
To the extent corporate law theory addresses a series of key recurring questions, one which qualifies is: “On whose behalf are companies
run?”111 The answer the team production model provides harkens back to
managerialist thinking associated with Berle and Means’s separation of
ownership and control thesis. As mentioned, Blair and Stout saw the
team production model as a challenger to shareholder primacy, with
boards acting as trustees working to promote the interests of all team
members rather than ultimately looking out only for shareholders.112
Their interpretation of their model echoes the managerialist thinking of
Adolf Berle, who again characterized large corporations as “trustees for
the community” with directors not being under an onus to run their companies “for maximum profit.”113
Identifying parallels between team production theory and the
managerialist conception of the corporation is by no means novel. Harwell Wells, in a 2013 article on the historical relationship between
managerialism and corporate law, flagged the possibility that Blair and
Stout, with their team production theory, “repackage managerialism.”114
107. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
108. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986).
109. Robert C. Clark, Major Changes Lead Us Back to Basics (A Response to the Symposium
on My Treatise), 31 J. CORP. L. 591, 595 (2006).
110. CHEFFINS, supra note 10, at 23, 70–76. Other possibilities include market-driven improvement via competition in the marketplace for ideas and “fads and fashions.” Id. at 67–70, 76–82.
111. Id. at 72.
112. See supra notes 88–90 and related discussion.
113. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
114. Wells, supra note 52, at 352 n.225.
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George Dent has likewise referred to the team production model as “[a]
modern variation on managerialism . . . .”115
Stout has, writing independently from Blair, recently evinced considerable enthusiasm for managerialism. Indeed, consistent with the
proposition that influential schools of thought can have a cyclical dimension, she has suggested a managerialist comeback could be in the cards.
She has conceded that managerial capitalism was “hardly perfect,” but
nevertheless maintains it generated “good results.”116 Shareholder primacy, she says, has been a different story. In a 2013 article published as part
of the proceedings of the Fourth Berle Symposium, Stout argued that
because empirical evidence showed shareholder primacy had failed to
deliver superior returns for the supposed beneficiaries—stockholders—
“it [was] time to move on to another theory.”117 What would it be? Stout
predicted—“albeit with caution”—that “American corporations are likely
to respond to the disappointments of shareholder primacy by returning to
what worked for more than half a century: some form of managerial
capitalism.”118 Stout acknowledged that the new corporate philosophy
was “unlikely to be called managerial capitalism. But it will bear the
hallmarks of managerialism.”119
This acknowledgement means we have from Stout a prediction for
the trajectory of corporate law scholarship in addition to the claim that
team production theory will become a key element of a new corporate
law theory paradigm. Can Stout’s 2013 prediction of “managerialism
115. George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J. CORP. L.
39, 51 (2005).
116. Stout, supra note 9, at 1171.
117. Id. at 1181.
118. Id. See also Chris Gay, Are Shareholders Their Own Worst Enemies?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Sept. 5, 2012), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/mutualfunds/articles/2012/09/05/are-shareholders-their-own-worst-enemies (interview with Stout in which
she was asked whether some form of managerialism would replace shareholder value and she replied
that “[t]he lovely thing about the business world is that, given a little breathing room, it’s highly
adaptable”).
119. Stout, supra note 9, at 1182. Stout elaborates in this article by saying that, consistent with
what would be expected if the managerialism she had in mind would be akin to that which was influential in the 1950s and 1960s, the companies in question would “be owned by dispersed passive
investors with little or no influence over the firms’ affairs.” Id. The two examples of “neomanagerialist firms” to which she draws attention, however, do not fit the traditional managerialist
pattern. One is firms going public “with multiple share classes that allow the firms’ founders and
executives to retain voting control.” Id. In firms of this sort there will be dominant shareholders
whose influence over senior executives will mean that management will be unable to exercise the
sort of autonomy typically associated with managerialism. The other example Stout provides is
private equity firms which have gone public, such as Blackstone, Carlyle Group, KKR and Apollo.
Id. at 1183. The founders of these firms own dominant stakes, reinforced by the issuance of shares to
the public with reduced voting rights attached. Yet again in firms of this sort executives will necessarily lack the freedom of action typically associated with managerialism.
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redux” be reconciled with her assertions concerning the team production
model? Since parallels can readily be drawn between team production
theory and the managerialist conception of the corporation, it might seem
so. In fact, since managerialism appears to leave boards little room to
perform the mediating function that is integral to team production theory,
any such reconciliation can, at best, be merely partial.120
Under team production theory, the board is an independent body at
the peak of the corporate hierarchy serving as the final arbiter when executives, shareholders, employees, and other corporate constituencies
cannot resolve disputes at lower levels.121 This type of board is a far
more important governance mechanism than the type of board associated
with managerial capitalism. As the term “managerialism” implies, with
this intellectual model, senior executives, not directors, occupy center
stage. According to Stephen Bainbridge, under managerialism
“[d]irectors are figureheads, while shareholders are nonentities. Managers are thus autonomous actors free to pursue whatever interests they
choose.”122 With “figurehead” directors managerialist boards are unlikely
candidates to function as the neutral mediating hierarchs the team production model contemplates. Indeed Dent claims that “[w]hen managers
dominate boards, the team production theory is unworkable.”123
There can be little doubt that boards of the managerialist corporations of the 1950s and 1960s were fundamentally ill suited to operate in
accordance with team production theory. During these decades, nearly
half of the individuals serving as directors of public companies worked
for the same firm in an executive capacity; less than one-quarter were
genuinely independent, and boards were expected to operate as little
more than a sounding board for the chief executive officer.124 Under such
circumstances boards were “largely passive instruments of the CEO” and
“an extension of management.”125 Hence, during the “heyday
120. Another disconnect between team production theory and managerialism is that the latter
was informed by concerns about corporate power and a social ethos predicated upon managers having a public role to play, whereas Blair and Stout structured the team production model with an
explicitly economic foundation oriented around the protection of firm-specific investments put at
risk in collaborative ventures. See Wells, supra note 52, at 352 n.225; Dent, supra note 115, at 51. It
has indeed been said that describing team production theory as a reformulation of the managerialism
of the 1960s is a mischaracterization. Peter C. Kostant, Team Production Theory and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 690 (2002).
121. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 279, 282.
122. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 9 (2008); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 561 (2003) (quoting Adolf Berle and E. Merrick
Dodd to illustrate the point).
123. Dent, supra note 115, at 56.
124. Gordon, supra note 51, at 1473–75, 1513–14.
125. Id. at 1511, 1514.
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of . . . corporate managerialism,”126 boards could not realistically perform
the role team production theory assigns to them.
Stout’s recent scholarship does not provide an obvious path for reconciling her support for managerialism with her board-centric team production theory. Stout, in the 2013 article where she offered conjectures
concerning the return of managerialist corporations, did not discuss team
production theory, and cited the 1999 team production article she cowrote with Blair only once so as to make a point concerning corporate
law doctrine.127 Likewise, in The Shareholder Value Myth, she offered
little explicit guidance on the interrelationship between team production
theory and a potential reemergence of managerialism.128
Jonathan Macey lacks any doubt regarding Stout’s stance on
managerialism. He maintained in a 2013 review of The Shareholder Value Myth that the key words in the book were “managerial choice” and
suggested that her “message, slightly obscured, but discernible nevertheless, is that managers should run the corporation with plenary authority
and with no reference to the shareholders’ interests.”129 Whether Stout in
fact is, as Macey asserted, a believer in “managerial primacy,”130 is open
to question given the board-centric nature of team production theory.
Nevertheless, when Stout discussed directors in conjunction with executives in The Shareholder Value Myth, her standard formulation was “directors and executives (or managers),”131 implying in a managerialist
fashion that boards and management are on the same team.
If directors and executives are equated in the manner Stout has done
in her 2012 book, it becomes doubtful whether directors will be able to
exercise the independent judgment required for them to be the mediating
hierarchs team production theory contemplates. Perhaps she is simply
being realistic. Various observers have suggested that present day boards
are too much under the sway of senior executives for boards to function

126. Id. at 1511.
127. Stout, supra note 9, at 1171 n.15.
128. On analysis of team production theory in this monograph, see STOUT, supra note 5, at 80–
85.
129. Jonathan Macey, Sublime Myths: An Essay in Honor of the Shareholder Value Myth and
the Tooth Fairy, 91 TEX. L. REV. 911, 914 (2013).
130. Id. at 917.
131. See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 5, at 3 (“This sort of thinking drives directors and executives
to run public firms like BP with a relentless focus on raising stock price . . . many individual directors and executives feel uneasy about such strategies.”); id. at 35, 36 (characterizing the managerial
agents in principal–agent theory as “directors and executives”); id. at 47 (describing strategies that
could be adopted to encourage “directors and executives” to embrace shareholder value); id. at 59
(discussing academics who believe “directors and executives” should have objectives other than
promoting shareholder value); id. at 108 (saying that theories such as team production do not always
provide clear guidance on what “directors and managers” should adopt as a corporation’s goal).
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in the manner team production theory presupposes.132 For present purposes, however, the key point is that Stout’s predictions that there will be
a (sub-)paradigm shift to team production theory and a return to managerial capitalism conflict cannot be readily reconciled.
IV. THE INCONVENIENT TRUTH OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM
Assume, despite the doubts expressed in Part III.B, that one can
plausibly characterize the development of corporate law theory in
Kuhnian terms. Team production theory’s position nevertheless remains
somewhat unclear. While Blair and Stout have suggested it may be part
of a new corporate law paradigm, the model also can plausibly be characterized as an example of contractarian normal science (See Part III.A).
The team production model also harkens back to the separation of ownership and control paradigm in the sense that it might be managerialism
revisited (See Part III.B).
While the interrelationship between team production theory and
prior corporate law theory paradigms is not straightforward, Blair and
Stout did unambiguously identify the team production model in their
1999 article as a challenger to the notion of shareholder wealth maximization.133 Could the team production model in fact emerge as a (sub)paradigm to replace shareholder primacy? In Kuhnian terms this could
only occur if inexplicable anomalies afflicted the shareholder primacy
norm so as to set the stage for a paradigm shift.134 As we will see now,
intellectual challenges to the shareholder value norm accelerated in pace
after Blair and Stout introduced the team production model. Conceivably, then, sufficiently serious anomalies have emerged for a paradigm
shift to occur that would be oriented around team production theory. A
narrative of this sort must confront, however, the “inconvenient truth”135
of hedge fund activism.
Interventions by hedge funds are currently compelling executives in
U.S. public corporations to treat shareholder value as a higher priority
than was the case when Blair and Stout unveiled team production theory.136 Directors otherwise inclined to act as mediating hierarchs in the
balanced fashion that team production theory contemplates correspond132. John C. Coates, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are
U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 845–46 (1999); George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in
Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1230–31 (2008); Meese, supra note 11, at 1699–1700.
133. See supra notes 89–90 and related discussion.
134. See supra notes 26, 53 and accompanying text.
135. The borrowing from the title of the 2006 climate change documentary “An Inconvenient
Truth” is intentional. An Inconvenient Truth (Paramount Classics 2006).
136. See infra Part IV.B.
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ingly might well feel compelled to continue to treat shareholders as their
top priority. To the extent this is true, hedge fund activism will postpone,
perhaps indefinitely, the displacement of shareholder primacy required
for the ascension of team production theory as a corporate law (sub)paradigm.
A. Shareholder Primacy Anomalies
While Blair and Stout were critical of shareholder primacy theory
in their 1999 article, they acknowledged that “shareholder primacy ha[d]
become increasingly popular” as the twentieth century drew to a close.137
Moreover, they said that law and economics scholars who were advocates of shareholder wealth maximization and “progressive” academics
who opposed this normative objective still agreed “that, as a descriptive
matter, American corporate law follows the shareholder primacy model.”138 A core element of Blair and Stout’s critique of shareholder primacy was that this diagnosis of corporate law was erroneous. They argued
that corporate law doctrines in fact “continue[d] to preserve directors’
discretion to act as mediators among all relevant corporate constituents.”139 To make their point, they analyzed two areas of corporate law
where shareholders are uniquely privileged as compared to other constituencies affiliated with corporations, namely having standing to enforce
breaches of duty by directors by way of a derivative suit and having the
right to vote on prescribed key issues such as the election of directors.140
With derivative suits, Blair and Stout pointed out that even if formally only shareholders can launch these, the purpose of such proceedings is to enforce duties owed to the corporation rather than duties owed
to shareholders, and stressed that, due to the business judgment rule, directors have wide discretion to comply with these duties.141 This led them
to argue that, contrary to what shareholder primacy implies,
“[s]hareholders in public corporations can sue successfully in the firm’s
name only in situations where bringing suit benefits not only the shareholders, but the other stakeholders in the coalition as well.”142 With
shareholder voting rights, Blair and Stout conceded in their 1999 article
that shareholder rights to select directors and vote on certain fundamental
corporate changes seemed “to grant shareholders a much greater measure
of control over how the firm is run than other members of the coalition
137. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 327.
138. Id. at 287.
139. Id. at 327.
140. Id. at 288–89.
141. Id. at 292–309.
142. Id. at 309.
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enjoy.”143 Citing the fact that “legal and practical obstacles to shareholder action render voting rights almost meaningless,” Blair and Stout countered by saying that the right to vote on corporate changes was a “fig
leaf” and “that shareholders in public corporations do not in any realistic
sense elect boards. Rather boards elect themselves.”144
Blair and Stout reviewed corporate law doctrine again in the 2006
article that was a part of the symposium focusing on Robert Clark’s corporate law treatise, citing various “anomalies” to indicate how “corporate
law departs from the predictions of the principal–agent model.”145 By
this point, they were by no means alone in casting doubt upon shareholder primacy as legal doctrine. Eric Talley said in 2002 “that much of corporate law has already rejected shareholder primacy arguments in favor
of allowing managers greater freedom of action.”146 In the same symposium issue that included Blair and Stout’s 2006 article, Jill Fisch observed that “[c]ommentators widely recognize that shareholder primacy
functions more as a norm than an enforceable legal rule.”147 Along similar lines, Martin Gelter suggested in a 2013 paper that U.S. corporate law
“reflect[ed] the managerialist world.”148 Jonathan Macey also noted in
his review of The Shareholder Value Myth that “shareholder primacy . . . is not law at all . . . and nobody thinks that it is.”149
The post-1999 challenge to shareholder primacy extended beyond
corporate law doctrine. Blair and Stout noted in their 2006 article that
“corporate scholars are involved in an escalating debate over the best
way to understand the modern corporation,”150 but the trend was by no
means restricted to corporate law academics. An intellectual assault on
shareholder primacy began in earnest with the drop in share prices occurring when the “dot.com” stock market boom ended in 2000.151 Lisa Fairfax said in her 2006 Clark treatise symposium paper that “[s]ince 2000,
corporate disclosure reflects a shift from the traditional shareholder ru-

143. Id. at 310.
144. Id. at 311 (emphasis in original).
145. Blair and Stout, supra note 5, at 743.
146. Eric Talley, On the Demise of Shareholder Primacy (Or, Murder on the James Trains
Express), 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1213 (2002).
147. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy,
31 J. CORP. L. 637, 650 (2006).
148. Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 36 SETON HALL
L. REV. 909, 920 (2013).
149. Macey, supra note 129, at 911.
150. Blair and Stout, supra note 5, at 743.
151. Justin Fox, How Shareholders Are Ruining American Business, ATLANTIC MONTHLY
(June 19, 2013, 10:05 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/07/stop-spoiling-theshareholders/309381/.
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bric to an embrace of rhetoric focused on stakeholders.”152 To illustrate
her point, she quoted a 2005 Economist survey on corporate social responsibility that argued this movement had “won the battle for ideas,”
meaning it was difficult to find a big company that would justify its existence purely in terms of profit.153
The 2008–2009 financial crisis put the shareholder value norm under further pressure.154 A 2009 editorial in the Financial Times suggested
“[a] palace revolution in the realm of business is toppling the dictatorship
of shareholder value maximisation as the sole guiding principle for corporate action.”155 Indeed, as Stout observed in The Shareholder Value
Myth, “[e]ven former champions of shareholder primacy [were] beginning to rethink the wisdom of chasing shareholder value.”156 She cited
the example of Jack Welch, former chief executive of General Electric
and an early advocate of shareholder value maximization, who claimed
in a 2009 Financial Times interview, “[S]hareholder value is the dumbest
idea in the world.”157 Similarly, Michael Jensen, co-author of a foundational article on principal–agent theory,158 said, “I have never said—and
if I have I was being stupid—that a company should be run for its stockholders.”159
Stout’s The Shareholder Value Myth and similar views expressed
by other academics prompted New York Times columnist Joe Nocera to
say in 2012 that “it feels as if we are at the dawn of a new movement—
one aimed at overturning the hegemony of shareholder value.”160 It might
seem, then, that the intellectual ferment qualifies in Kuhnian terms as a
sufficient accumulation of anomalies to provide the platform for a paradigm (or at least sub-paradigm) shift away from the shareholder primacy
norm in favor of a (sub-)paradigm oriented around team production. It is
152. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on
Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 691 (2006).
153. Id.; see also The Good Company: A Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 3.
154. Justin Baer, Francesco Guerrera & Richard Milne, A Need to Reconnect, FIN. TIMES
(Asia), Mar. 13, 2009, at 9 (“Long-held tenets of corporate faith—the pursuit of shareholder value . . . —are being blamed for the turmoil and look likely to be overhauled.”); A New Idolatry,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 2010, at 65 (saying the shareholder value norm “was spreading rapidly around
the world until the financial crisis hit, calling its wisdom into question”).
155. Shareholder Value Re-evaluated, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 16, 2009, at 12.
156. STOUT, supra note 5, at 5.
157. Id. at 5–6; Francesco Guerrera, Welch Denounces Corporate Obsessions, FIN. TIMES
(U.S.), Mar. 16, 2009, at 1.
158. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64.
159. Quoted in Terence Corcoran, A CEO Fix We Do Not Need, NAT’L POST (Jan. 6, 2012),
http://opinion.financialpost.com/2012/01/06/terence-corcoran-a-ceo-fix-we-dontneed/#__federated=1.
160. Joe Nocera, Down With Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2012, at 19.
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far from clear, however, that matters have reached this stage. Nocera, for
example, substantially hedged his bets, saying of the challenge to shareholder primacy, “[I]t is hard to know yet whether this new movement
will have legs” and observing, “[S]hareholder value is so deeply entrenched, it will be difficult to dislodge.”161
The shareholder value norm certainly continues to have its defenders. For instance, even though Macey said in his review of The Shareholder Myth that he believed the shareholder primacy norm was an “illusion” in the sense that executives were neither bound by law to promote
shareholder value, nor were genuinely convinced they should act in this
manner, he maintained shareholder primacy served a valuable governance function as a benchmark for identifying self-serving managerial
conduct.162 There is a more prosaic reason, however, why it is unlikely
that the decks will be cleared soon in a way that provides the platform for
the intellectual dominance of a team production model presupposing
boards will act as neutral arbiters and mediating hierarchs. This is the
growing prominence of hedge fund activism.
B. The Prominence of Hedge Fund Activism
In the 2000s a sub-set of hedge funds—collective investment vehicles structured to operate outside the scope of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulation of investment companies (i.e., mutual
funds)—stepped forward in earnest as activist investors targeting underperforming companies.163 The typical tactic of an activist hedge fund was
to build up quietly a sizeable strategic holding in a public company those
running the hedge fund believed was failing to maximize shareholder
returns and then agitate for change to correct matters.164 Common demands were for targeted companies to return cash to shareholders by way
of a stock buyback or a one-off dividend payment, to sell weak divisions
to improve the bottom line, or even to put the company itself up for
sale.165

161. Id.
162. Macey, supra note 129, at 911–12, 916, 924. For other examples, see A New Idolatry,
supra note 154 (arguing that the shareholder value model should not be replaced but deployed more
effectively); Shareholder Value (Lex Column), FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009 (“[W]hile the theory of
shareholder value is down, it is not out. There is no intellectually coherent alternative.”); Russ
Banham, Accountable to Whom? A Defense of Shareholder Primacy, CFO, Nov. 2012, at 54 (citing
views of Charles Elson).
163. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism
by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 75, 80–82 (2011).
164. Id. at 57–59.
165. Id. at 60–61.
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By the mid-2000s it was clear hedge fund activism was a potentially significant corporate governance phenomenon.166 The financial crisis
sideswiped activist funds but they rallied quickly.167 They subsequently
went from strength to strength, launching campaigns at more than onefifth of the companies in the S&P 500 between 2009 and 2014.168 In
2012, the Wall Street Journal suggested that the acquisition of a $2 billion stake in Proctor & Gamble Co. by Pershing Square Capital Management, a leading activist hedge fund run by William Ackman, reflected
“a new era of activist investing” and meant “even America’s largest corporations need to keep an eye out for investors who might push for board
seats and big shifts in strategy.”169 The Financial Times said 2013
marked “the triumph of activism” and Barron’s observed the same year
that “activist investing ha[d] entered a new golden age.”170 In 2014, the
New York Times said of Daniel Loeb’s Third Point LLC, another major
activist hedge fund, and its brethren, “They have amassed huge war
chests to take on some of the biggest names in corporate America—and
win more often than not.”171
The success activist hedge funds have had obtaining representation
on boards illustrates their growing influence. While when Blair and Stout
wrote their 1999 article on team production boards may well have in effect elected themselves,172 hedge funds can now have a substantial say
when they target companies. According to FactSet Research, 60% of
proxy fights prompted by a hedge fund activist that went to an actual
vote in 2013 resulted in at least a partial activist victory, the highest win
rate in the thirteen years the firm had been tracking the data.173 Though
hedge fund activists only obtained directorships at eighteen U.S. public
companies in 2013 when a vote occurred, on seventy-two additional occasions they secured board seats in settlements reached after launching a
proxy contest.174 Moreover, in a departure from past practice, public

166. Id. at 53.
167. Id. at 53.
168. The Barbarians Return to the Gate, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2014, at 10 (citing data from
FactSet Research Systems).
169. Scott Thurm & David Benoit, Activists Go After Big Game, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2012, at
B1.
170. Stephen Foley, The Brave New World of Investor Activism, FIN. TIMES (U.S.), Dec. 24,
2013, at 15; Avi Salzman, How to Profit From Today’s Shareholder Activism, BARRON’S, Nov. 30,
2013, at 25.
171. Michael J. de la Merced & Alexandra Stevenson, Sotheby’s Yields to Hedge Fund Mogul
and Allies, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2014, at B1.
172. See supra note 144 and related discussion.
173. FactSet Research, Activists Increasing Success Gaining Board Seats at US Companies
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.factset.com/insight/2014/3/sharkspotlight_3.11.14.
174. Id.
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companies have begun offering, as a means of forestalling prolonged
confrontation, boardroom representation to activists who have not even
launched proxy contests for board seats.175 Carl Icahn, a veteran shareholder activist, remarked in 2013 he was “surprised” how readily board
seats were being offered without a proxy fight.176
The success of hedge fund activists has in turn influenced the
boardroom agenda. The Financial Times indicated in 2013 that activists
were finding “more directors receptive to the traditional activist ideas of
returning capital, spinning off businesses and even inviting activists’ representatives on to the board.”177 Similarly, according to Barron’s,
“[C]ompanies under scrutiny see little choice but to unbolt their boardroom doors.”178 Companies, moreover, are not waiting until they have
been targeted to introduce changes hedge funds would view favorably. In
2013, the New York Times quoted the head of contested situations at a
major investment bank as saying, “Your defense today before an activist
shows up is all about blocking and tackling, dynamic self-assessment,
followed by really enhanced investor outreach.”179 In other words, those
running public companies “look at [their] company through the lens of
an activist.”180 Moody’s, the bond-rating agency, identified a potential
by-product in a 2014 report to clients, suggesting that bondholders could
face “a rising tide of credit negative events” as managers apprehensive
about hedge fund activism took action to distribute cash to shareholders
that jeopardized cost-saving initiatives.181
Activist hedge funds are not, on the other hand, having matters entirely their own way. Instead, a growing number of public company
boards are changing corporate bylaws to introduce a new generation of
poison pills—mechanisms designed to preclude an unwanted shareholder
from acquiring a stake above a prescribed level—that kick into operation
at considerably lower thresholds (typically around 10%) to bolster leverage in dealings with activist investors.182 Implicitly confirming Blair and
175. Id.; David Benoit, Companies, Activists Declare Truce in Boardroom Battles, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 10, 2013, at A1.
176. Id.
177. Foley, supra note 170.
178. Salzman, supra note 170.
179. David Gelles, Boardrooms Rethink Tactics to Defang Activist Investors, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2013, at F10 (quoting Chris Young of Credit Suisse).
180. Dan McCrum & David Gelles, Stirrers and Shakers, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 21, 2012,
at 7 (again quoting Chris Young of Credit Suisse).
181. Stephen Foley, Activist Funds Raise Corporate Bond Risk, Says Moody’s, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 10, 2014, at 30; David Benoit & Gillian Tan, Bondholders in Activists’ Crossfire,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2014, at C3.
182. Liz Hoffman, Bitter Medicine in Store for Activists, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2014, at C1; Liz
Hoffman, “Poison Pill” Gets a Bit More Toxic, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2014, at C1.

426

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 38:397

Stout’s observation that courts afford boards wide discretion to run corporations in the manner directors see fit, the Delaware Court of Chancery
upheld in a 2014 case the validity of a poison pill of auction house Sotheby’s that impinged upon Daniel Loeb’s Third Point.183
Though the Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling was likely a disappointment to hedge fund activists, it seems doubtful that this ruling
signifies the end of “the new era of activist investing.” In Sotheby’s dispute with Third Point, despite Sotheby’s courtroom victory, Sotheby’s
agreed to endorse Third Point’s three nominees as directors, partly due to
backing Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), an influential shareholder advisory firm, was providing for Third Point.184 So long as activist hedge funds can secure support from key players such as ISS, they
will continue to have considerable clout in the boardroom. For instance,
due to opposition from ISS in 2014, most of the thirty-three public companies that had adopted bylaws precluding directors nominated by activist shareholders from taking payments from activists reversed course.185
The upshot is that even if shareholder primacy has suffered setbacks in
the battle of ideas over the past few years, to the extent that directors
might be inclined to act as mediating hierarchs rather than focus on
shareholder value, hedge fund activism’s “triumph” means they will
pause. That is potentially an inconvenient truth for team production theory.
C. Blair, Stout, and Hedge Fund Activism
Blair and Stout did not refer to hedge funds or shareholder activists
in their 1999 article introducing the team production model.186 This is
hardly surprising. While some hedge fund activism occurred in the
1990s, it was not at that point a significant corporate governance phenomenon.187
Blair and Stout did briefly acknowledge in their 1999 article the
growth in prominence of mainstream institutional shareholders—mutual
funds and pension funds—saying that a 1980s move to the forefront by
institutional investors might explain why boards, as mediating hierarchs,
had been directing to shareholders an increasing proportion of the surplus

183. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 64 (Del. Ch. May 2,
2014).
184. Steven M. Davidoff, A Truce at Sotheby’s After a Costly and Avoidable Battle, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2014, at B5.
185. Stephen Foley, Battle for the Boardroom, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 24, 2014, at 9.
186. The phrase “shareholder activism” does appear once in the article, but as part of the title
of an article cited. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 311 n.170.
187. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 163, at 79–81.
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corporate team production generated.188 Substantial growth in institutional ownership as a percentage of publicly traded shares may indeed help
to explain why shareholder primacy achieved prominence as the twentieth century drew to a close.189 Still, while the rise of institutional shareholders prompted predictions in the early 1990s that meaningful shareholder control of public companies could be in the cards, such expectations were largely unfulfilled.190 For instance, John Bogle, founder of the
Vanguard Mutual Fund Group, remarked in 2007 upon “the virtual absence of mutual funds and private pension funds from actual participation in corporate governance.”191 Correspondingly, it is understandable
that when Blair and Stout initially presented their team production model, they did not treat shareholder activism as a major stumbling block for
directors seeking to operate as mediating hierarchs rather than merely as
agents for shareholders.
What have Blair and Stout had to say about the subsequent surge in
hedge fund activism? To this point, Margaret Blair has only referred to
hedge funds very briefly in her writing and has not sought to address in
any detail the implications of the “golden age” of hedge fund activism
for the team production model or for corporate law theory more generally.192 Lynn Stout has been more forthcoming. She has acknowledged, for
instance, that the influence of hedge funds and shareholders more generally has been growing. In a 2008 article she and Iman Anabtawi cowrote, they said that “because of activist hedge funds, ‘the balance of
power is shifting away from boards.’”193 Moreover, in a 2013 article in
which Stout agreed with Ed Rock that U.S. corporate governance was a
“shareholder-centric” system, she acknowledged the “increasing clout”
of hedge funds, together with mainstream investors, and indicated that
“shifts in corporate law and practice over the past two decades” had
188. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 325–26.
189. Gordon, supra note 51, at 1528–29.
190. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 601, 628–30 (2006); THE HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note
31, at xix–xx.
191. John C. Bogle, Democracy in Corporate America, 136 DAEDAULS 24, 31 (2007).
192. In a chapter in a research handbook on corporate law Blair cited empirical research indicating that hedge fund activism can have an adverse impact on bondholders. See Blair, supra note
84, at 46. Otherwise, it does not appear that Blair has written about activist hedge funds. An April
2014 Westlaw search of law reviews using the search term “hedge fund” and stipulating that “Blair”
be the author yielded no “hits.” Running the same author search in conjunction with the search term
“shareholder primacy” yielded one post-mid-2000s hit, a 2013 article in which Blair mentioned the
term once in a footnote. Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 785, 820 n.194.
193. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1279 (2008). The quote they relied upon was from Bank of America Securities’ head of
global mergers and acquisitions.
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“largely solved” the problem of “wayward managers exploiting helpless
shareholders.”194
Stout’s observations concerning shareholder activism trends do not
fit readily with her prediction concerning team production model’s
emergence as a new corporate law paradigm. It is difficult to see how
directors can act effectively as mediating hierarchs in the way team production theory requires in a milieu where hedge funds are fostering a
shift of power in favor of shareholders in what has already, according to
Stout, evolved into a shareholder-centric corporate governance system.
Correspondingly, even if the shareholder primacy norm has been subjected to intellectual criticism, it hardly seems the decks are clear, or are
likely to be soon, for the arrival of a new corporate law (sub-)paradigm
in which team production theory will be an integral element.
The inconvenient truth hedge fund activism poses for the team production model does not mean Stout is waving any white flags. Instead, in
her symposium contribution for the Fourth Berle Symposium, she said
shareholder primacy had been “largely falsified” and asserted “it is time
to move on to another theory,” heralding in so doing “some form of
managerial capitalism” as a contender.195 Why might a shareholdercentric system bolstered by hedge fund activism be on the ropes in the
manner Stout implies? She went on to say in her contribution to the
Fourth Berle Symposium that shareholder primacy was like Communism, in that both were theories that were “embraced for a period of
time” but were “not firmly grounded in the realities of the world” and
thus were “doomed to fail.”196
In what sense has shareholder primacy not been “firmly grounded”?
Stout suggested that while shareholder primacy might be “elegant and
intellectually appealing” it had failed to deliver beneficial results, not
only for corporate constituencies other than shareholders, but for shareholders themselves.197 How can it be that shareholder primacy has
worked out badly for shareholders? Here, hedge fund activists, characterized by Stout as investors who are “notorious” for owning shares for
short periods,198 have been tagged as culprits. According to Stout, “the
new shareholder-centric reality causes managers to think, in particular,
like short-term shareholders,”199 thereby prompting counterproductively

194. Lynn Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003,
2009, 2019 (2013).
195. Stout, supra note 9, at 1181.
196. Id. at 1184.
197. Id. at 1181; Stout, supra note 194, at 2023.
198. Stout, supra note 194, at 2017.
199. Id. at 2019 (emphasis added).
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myopic business decisions that erode shareholder returns over the long
haul.200
Stout, in The Shareholder Value Myth, elaborated upon how the
agenda of hedge fund activists differ from that of other shareholders. She
contrasted “universal” owners (retail investors and institutional investors
such as pension funds with stakes in the economy and the community
other than shares in public companies), with hedge funds, which she said
exercised disproportionate and counterproductive influence by “taking
relatively large positions in relatively few companies . . . [to] position
themselves with realistic threats of embarrassing news stories and proxy
battles.”201 According to Stout, the interests of hedge fund activists and
universal owners “often clash.”202 This is because hedge funds pressure
companies to make changes that bolster shareholder returns in the few
companies in which they own stock, while the interests of diversified
universal owners are prejudiced because the changes are likely to prompt
the value of other investments held (e.g., bonds) to decline and cause the
value of employee benefits such as pensions to be cut.
The dynamics of share ownership in publicly traded companies cast
doubt on Stout’s argument that the interests of hedge fund activists and
mainstream institutional shareholders—key examples of her “universal
owners”—are destined to clash. If disagreements between hedge fund
activists and mainstream institutional investors were fundamental and
commonplace, hedge fund activism would be a much less prevalent and
influential strategy than it is currently. Hedge fund activists acquire, on
average, ownership stakes of 8% in the public companies they target.203
Under such circumstances, hedge fund activists will only have significant
leverage over the directors of the companies they target if they can persuade a substantial proportion of other shareholders to support the initiatives they propose.204 As William Ackman, the prominent hedge fund
activist, has said: “The vast majority of capital in the world is passive.
These investors control the votes. If they think an activist is wrong, they
won’t support him. But at least they have a choice.”205
200. Id. at 2017.
201. STOUT, supra note 5, at 94.
202. Id. at 92.
203. Ronald Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 899 (2013).
204. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 163, at 67; Robert C. Pozen, The Misdirected War on
Corporate Short-Termism, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2014, at A11.
205. Francesco Guerrera, Activist Investors—A Roar or a Bark?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2013,
at C1. See also Stephen Foley, Hedge Funds Launch Bonus Fight, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 29,
2013, at 15 (quoting a partner at Jana Partners, an activist hedge fund, as saying: “Our only real
constituency is shareholders. If we can convince them we have a structure that works then we can
get there.”).

430

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 38:397

Given the choice shareholders have concerning hedge fund activist
initiatives, as Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon have observed, with
U.S. public companies “both activist and institutional shareholders must
agree for a proposal to go forward.”206 Due to this “happy complementarity,”207 a direct clash of interests between hedge fund activists and other
shareholders should be the exception to the rule.208
Mainstream institutional shareholders began offering backing for
hedge fund activists with regularity in the early 2000s, which set the
stage for hedge funds to emerge as meaningful governance players.209
The “happy complementarity” between hedge fund activists and institutional shareholders seems to be growing in strength, which in turn has
helped to foster the post-financial crisis surge in activism.210 In 2013,
Mary Jo White, the Securities and Exchange Commission chairwoman,
indicated that while “the ‘activist’ moniker had a distinctly negative connotation” there was now “widespread acceptance of many of the policy
changes that so-called ‘activists’ are seeking to effect.”211 Indeed, U.S.
pension funds have begun investing directly in activist hedge funds and
activist Carl Icahn has said that some mainstream institutional investors
“even egg us on.”212 Given such observations, it is not only doubtful that
206. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 203, at 897. See also Andrew Ross Sorkin, For Activist
Shareholders, A Wide Reporting Window, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2014, at B1 (saying of hedge fund
activists: “[I]f the rest of the shareholders do not agree with you, you’re toast”).
207. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 203, at 898. See also David Gelles & Michael J. de la
Merced, New Alliances in Battle for Corporate Control, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2014, at B1 (referring
to “collaboration”).
208. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 163, at 67; George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of
Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 117 (2010) (saying it
is not credible that investors would have failed to catch on if hedge funds were promoting a shortterm agenda at the expense of long-term returns, reasoning: “Are the vast majority of investors idiots? Quite simply, the investing public perceives these situations not as a threat but a boon to share
value.”).
209. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 163, at 87.
210. Alexandra Stevenson, No Barbarians at the Gate; Instead, a Force for Change, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2014, at B1 (quoting William Ackman as saying, “It used to be that boards of decentsized companies were impenetrable. What’s changed is that institutions are prepared to replace directors, including the chairman and chief executive in light of underperformance.”); Adam Shell,
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the priorities of hedge fund activists and other shareholders diverge in
the manner Stout has suggested, but also that directors will be in a position any time soon where they can treat shareholders as just another corporate constituency to take into account in the boardroom. It correspondingly seems unlikely that team production theory will displace shareholder primacy as a corporate governance paradigm (or sub-paradigm) in
the foreseeable future.
V. CONCLUSION
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, in their path-breaking 1999 article
A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, neither cited Thomas
Kuhn nor referred to their team production model as a potential new corporate law paradigm.213 Their failure to do so is not surprising given that
they situated the model as an elaboration upon the then dominant mode
of corporate law thinking: the nexus of contracts model. Correspondingly, it might seem that this Article, by evaluating the team production
model by reference to Kuhn and his notions of scientific revolutions and
paradigm shifts, engages in inappropriate benchmarking. Blair and Stout,
however, did invoke Kuhn explicitly in a 2006 paper on anomalies—
another Kuhnian term—affecting corporate law theory when arguing
team production theory could be part of a new corporate law paradigm.214
Correspondingly, for the purposes of this symposium on the team production model, Kuhn and his work provide an appropriate reference
point for analyzing Blair and Stout’s model.
This Article shows that, on various levels, situating team production theory as a new corporate law paradigm is problematic. It is unclear
whether Kuhnian concepts can be deployed appropriately with corporate
law theory, especially given that the scientific method of inquiry of interest to Kuhn has not been routinely invoked by corporate law scholars and
given that the intellectual consensus required for Kuhn’s normal science
to occur may have never been present in the corporate law realm. Additionally, even if corporate law scholarship trends are reducible to
Kuhnian terms, team production theory’s status as a new paradigm is
questionable. Not only did Blair and Stout fail to challenge directly in
their path-breaking 1999 article the dominant contractarian paradigm, but
their characterization of boards under team production resembles in various ways managerialist thinking associated with the separation of ownerinstitutions who are disappointed with the performance of companies they are invested in to see if
we would be interested in playing an active role in effectuating change.”).
213. The word “paradigm” was used once as part of the phrase “rational actor paradigm.”
Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 317 n.183.
214. Blair & Stout, supra note 5. See also supra note 20 and related discussion.
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ship and control paradigm that preceded the intellectual dominance of the
nexus of contracts model.
It is true that Blair and Stout directly challenged in their 1999 article a shareholder primacy norm often linked with the nexus of contracts
model that could perhaps be characterized as a sub-paradigm of corporate law scholarship. In so doing, they made various telling points concerning corporate law doctrine. Nevertheless, subsequent events indicate
that shareholder primacy may well be resilient in the corporate governance realm despite the strong intellectual challenge Blair and Stout and
others posed. In particular, a surge in hedge fund activism occurring over
the past decade has meant that directors of public corporations have had
to treat shareholders as a priority in a way that team production theory
does not countenance.
While this Article has shown that team production theory is unlikely to achieve paradigmatic status within the realm of corporate law theory, this does not detract markedly from the contribution that Blair and
Stout’s 1999 article has made to corporate law scholarship. Academic
work that qualifies as the foundation for a new paradigm is exceedingly
rare, even assuming that an intellectual discipline is suited for analysis in
Kuhnian terms. Team production theory seems unlikely to become part
of such rarefied company. Nevertheless, Blair and Stout’s 1999 article
has been widely read and cited and has prompted considerable debate
among legal academics and more broadly. The Sixth Berle Symposium is
merely the most recent evidence of the article’s substantial impact. Invoking Kuhn one last time, not bad for normal science!

